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Maiming Memes
A first attempt at sorting things out.
As a philosopher with an analytic touch I instinctivly shy away
from the daring conceptual strategy employed in the Memesis prospect.
While it is certainly true that "human evolution is fundamentally
intertwined with technological development" this does not support
an analogy between genes and "memes" in any serious sense.
Cultural studies can take their inspiration from the Sciences. But
they get really messed up if they conceptualize their subject matter
as some kind of scientific entity.
Taking the suggested analogy at face value one would have to discuss
problems arising from the uncritical transfer of categories appropriate
to the working of proteins to the description of human capabilities.
This is an embattled issue in the philosophy of science as well as
in critical anthropology. In my opinion one should be extremely
cautious in putting forward suggestions such as the analogy proposed
here, but I shall not pursue this matter at the moment.
Obviously, in introducing "memes" into the discussion of recent
developments in Cyberspace, a less than rigorous use is made of
the relevant concepts. I read the prospect as an exercise in stretching
one's phantasy, risking some interesting and possibly
irritating conceptual displacements in the process. Since I am,
amongst other things, working in film theory it occurred to me that
a helpful response to the slightly exotic notional blend we are offered
by the organizers of the symposium might be some reflections on
Kathryn Bigelows "Strange Days" and in particular on the science fiction
device of so called SQUID technology.
SQUID clips, to put it bluntly, are digitally recorded chunks of experience.
The complete set of emotions and perceptions of a person at a particular
moment in time is thought to be recorded by a fancy device. The
implications for the present discussion are clear. We are invited to
imagine perfectly externalized memories that can be shared and objectivly
investigated at the same time. Never mind the improbability of such a
phantasy becoming true. It can help to bring out some crucial features
of our conceptual setup with regard to past experiences.
I will only offer a tentative intuition and gladly elaborate on it during
discussion. What is the appeal of letting one's imagination be caught
by SQUID? Being able to treat something that has been elusive
up to now as an ordinary thing. Sounds used to be transitory until recording
techniques enabled us to permanently capture acoustic events. We can
listen to a Toscanini concert decades after it has taken place. Similarly,
we can live trough the experience of someone who wore a strange
head-mounted device.
Does this make sense? (I am _n_o_t_ talking about feasibility but about
conceptual coherence.) Well, it depends on the burden you put on
"listen to a Toscanini concert" and "live through the experience of someone"
respectivly. There are perfectly appropriate uses of these terms.
If two people who had a car accident under similar conditions talk about
"sharing the same experience" no one would object. But SQUID takes this
a lot further. I am supposed to have the _very_same_ experience that a
person had during the accident.
Cautious questions: What are the identity conditions of experiences and
in particular of memories? Can we just pick up the neural currents and
advertise them as the essence of what was going on? Is it really permissible
to treat the sound of a violin and the impression this sound makes
on a person at the same level? We can certainly device strategies
of measurement for both of them. But the printout of my neural
reactions is not my neural state.
I am approaching perennial philosophical problems here. And let me hasten
to add that I am not in the business of defending Cartesian dualism at
any cost. But I _do_ want to raise questions pertinent to this dilemma,
particularly as they are painfully missing from much of the current
debates on these issues.
Let me end in indicating how to apply the present considerations to
"memes". "Cognitive behavioral patterns that propagate and replicate
themselves through communication" used to be called "topoi",
"habits" or "cliches". They were thought to be social constants,
stable but subject to alterations at the margin. This feature
is lost in talk about "memes". They seem to be scientific
constructs that can be handled like cellular tissue.
Undoubtedly cultural memory can be manipulated, reconditioned and
altered to a considerable degree. But, I submit, we lose a
considerable amount of insight if we hasten to take biology as our
paradigm case.
h.h.
_______________________________________________
Herbert.Hrachovec@univie.ac.at
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria
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But whereas power is power because it transforms categories,
analysis is analysis because it keeps them apart.
Gunnar Olsson
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