LIFESCIENCE: First Statement Georg Schoefbaenker

[lifescience-owner@aec.at]

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ARS ELECTRONICA FESTIVAL 99
LIFESCIENCE
Linz, Austria, September 04 - 09
http://www.aec.at/lifescience
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Ars Electronica 99
Festival for Art, Technology and Society
LifeScience
September 4-9, 1999


Dr. Georg Schoefbaenker
 

Statement:
Net Symposium LifeScience

The Danger of the Military Misusing Biotechnologies

In contrast to the medical and industrial applications of biotechnologies and 
the general sociopolitical consequences that have already begun emerging from
the increasing use of discoveries in the field of biotechnology such as 
biometric processes, the "genetic fingerprint," or genetic diagnostics, the 
danger of the deployment of biological weapons has been known for decades. 
Even during the Second World War, experiments were being run with a number of
different pathogens using sheep on an British island in the North Sea. As 
far as we know, biological weapons-also known as the poor man's atom bomb-have
been used only once to date-by the Japanese Armed Forces during the Second 
World War. The so-called Gulf War Syndrome that was diagnosed among US veteran
was traced back at least in part to inoculations against biological weapons 
such as anthrax pathogens.

Lately, threat scenarios have been circulating within intelligence circles
whereby it is said to be possible to develop warfare agents which act only on
genetic characteristics of particular ethnic groups, so that only the "enemy" 
would be effected by such weapons. Regardless of whether this is a case of 
scientific nonsense or a real option of future weapons development, we know 
only too well from the past that the military basically either gets started on
its own with R&D on all new technologies (atomic weapons) or at least adapts 
them for their own purposes (infowar). However, it is a matter of fact that a
number of new weapons could be developed by genetically manipulating the great
many agents of bacteriological warfare that already exist and for which there 
are no known defenses. Indeed, the community of nations has passed an 
international disarmament treaty, the "Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention"
whereby it is agreed to neither produce nor use them, though without the 
verification procedures that are usually in place with other types of weapons.

Nevertheless, there have been numerous violations of this accord, the 
best-known case being Iraq's production of agents of biological warfare.
It is less well-known that the former USSR-although it had ratified the 
convention in 1975-also developed genetically-manipulated biological weapons,
as reported by Kenneth Alibek, a Russian weapons technologist who defected 
in 1992.
In recent months, there has been an outbreak of mass hysteria connected with 
"bioterrorism" and "bioarmageddon" in the US. These scenarios feature 
terrorists-usually foreigners-deploying biological weapons in that country.
To counter this threat, the Clinton Administration issued a directive in 
May 1998 and made $150 million in funding available.
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