LIFESCIENCE: North Atlantic Assembly releases Report about Biological Weapons

[schoefbaenker@magnet.at]

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ARS ELECTRONICA FESTIVAL 99
LIFESCIENCE
Linz, Austria, September 04 - 09
http://www.aec.at/lifescience
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The North Atlantic Assembly, a kind of parliamentarian Assembly from NATO
allies
released on April 16, 1999 a report about Biological Weapons.

This report is different from most of the hyper-alarmist views from
US-agencies and foundations. Here the core conclusions:


"45. Assessing the risks linked to the potential use of biological weapons
is not an easy task. Both "alarmist" and "complacent" views are not
contributing to the clarity of the debate. Your Rapporteur has tried to
focus on risks linked to proliferation and terrorism. Since proliferation
is mainly related to areas of potential conflict, the concern of the
international community has been growing increasingly in recent years.
However, experts point out that even Iraq did not cross the moral barriers
normally linked to the use of these weapons and renounced their use during
the Gulf War. Baghdad might too have feared a massive retaliation and
further isolation within the international community. Nonetheless,
uncertainty remains about their possible use in the future by Iraq or other
"rogue" states and the risk should not be underestimated.

46. In this respect, the adoption of a binding protocol in addition to the
1972 Convention is the "world's front line defence against the
proliferation of biological weapons."[28] National interests should not
prevent the negotiators from creating such an indispensable security tool.
And any objections about commercial confidentiality that are raised need to
be critically examined to ensure that they are not simply excuses for
inaction. Negotiations should benefit as well from the experience of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the protection of
commercial secrets and has elaborated a binding set of verification
measures. The creation of a small organisation to implement and monitor the
provisions of the Biological Convention could give some teeth to the
Protocol and enhance its efficiency.

47. The level of uncertainty is the same with regard to terrorist
activities. So far, the attack in the Japanese subway has been the only
example of a large-scale use of chemical agents (see p.6). This report has
pointed out the possible different military and civil responses currently
being considered to face the threat. However, it seems that no disposal can
provide absolute protection and that there is no substitute for concerted
and active action against terrorist groups. Intelligence and exchange of
information form the cornerstone of an efficient counter-terrorism strategy. 

48. In conclusion, understanding the real nature of the threat of
biological weapons as well as committing out appropriate resources to
counter them requires greater attention to the biological characteristics
of these instruments of war and terror. The dominant defence priority that
has been applied to nuclear and chemical weapons leaves us ill-equipped
conceptually and practically to assess and therefore prevent the
potentially devastating effects of bioterrorism. Strengthening the public
health and infectious disease infrastructure is one of the most effective
steps we can take to limit the damage that such use of biological agents
could bring to our societies.

the url is:

http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1999/as135stcmt-e.html#T1-3-C


 Science and Technology Committee
Sub-committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology 

Biological Weapons: the Threat of the New Century? 

Draft Interim Report    
Mr. Michael Mates (United Kingdom) 
Rapporteur* 
16 April 1999 

* Until this document has been approved by the Science and Technology
Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
II. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, A NEW PROBLEM ? 
A. DEFINITIONS 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST TREATIES 
C. EVOLUTION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONCERN 
III. RISKS OF PROLIFERATION AND BIOTERRORISM 
A. THE POOR MAN'S BOMB? 
B. THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION 
1. An overview of the proliferation problem 
2. The Iraqi case 
C. THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM 
IV. RESPONSES TO THE THREAT 
A. STRENGTHENING THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION 
B. THE MILITARY AND NATO'S RESPONSE 
C. RESPONDING TO THE TERRORIST THREAT 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
NOTES AND REFERENCES
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